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Abstract. In this paper we introduce three methods to approach philo-
sophical problems informationally: Minimalism, the Method of Abstrac-
tion and Constructionism. Minimalism considers the speciﬁcations of the
starting problems and systems that are tractable for a philosophical anal-
ysis. The Method of Abstraction describes the process of making explicit
the level of abstraction at which a system is observed and investigated.
Constructionism provides a series of principles that the investigation of
the problem must fulﬁl once it has been fully characterised by the pre-
vious two methods. For each method, we also provide an application:
the problem of visual perception, functionalism, and the Turing Test,
respectively.
1 Introduction
The Philosophy of Information is a new area of research at the intersection of
philosophy, computer science and ICT (information and communication technol-
ogy) [6] and [8]. It concerns (a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature
and basic principles of information, including its dynamics (especially computa-
tion), utilization (especially ethical issues) and sciences; and (b) the elaboration
and application of computational and information-theoretic methodologies to
philosophical problems. Past work by members of our group has concentrated
on (a). In this paper we explore (b). In a nutshell, we ask what computer science
can do for philosophy, rather than what the latter can do for the former.
Applications of computational methods to philosophical issues may be ap-
proached in three main ways:
1. Conceptual experiments in silico, or the externalization of the mental the-
atre. As Patrick Grim has remarked “since the eighties, philosophers too have
begun to apply computational modeling to questions in logic, epistemology,
philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philoso-
phy of biology, ethics, and social and political philosophy. [. . . ] A number
of authors portray computer experimentation in general as a technological
extension of an ancient tradition of thought experiment” [12].
2. Pancomputationalism, or the fallacy of a powerful metaphor. According to
this view, computational and informational concepts are so powerful that,
given the right Level of Abstraction (see section 3), anything could be pre-
sented as a computational system, from a building to a volcano, from a
forest to a dinner, from a brain to a company, and any process could be
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simulated computationally, heating and ﬂying, eating or knitting. Even non-
computable functions would be representable, although by abstracting them
to such a high level that they would no longer count as a system (one would
have to abstract output and even termination and the existence of output,
although a system has to be allowed to terminate or not, even if one does not
observe the output). Pancomputationalists (e.g. [3]) have the hard task of
providing a credible answers to the following two questions: (1) how can one
avoid blurring all diﬀerences among systems, thus transforming pancomputa-
tionalism into a night in which all cows are black, to paraphrase Hegel? And
(2) what would it mean for the system under investigation not to be an infor-
mational system (or a computational system, if computation = information
processing)? Pancomputationalism does not seem vulnerable to a refutation
(to put it in Popperian terms), in the form of a possible counterexample
in a world nomically identical to the one to which pancomputationalism is
applied.
3. Regulae ad directionem ingenii, or the Cartesian-Kantian approach. Are
there speciﬁc methods in computer science that can help us to approach
philosophical problems computationally?
In the following sections we answer this last question by introducing three
main methods: Minimalism, the Method of Abstraction and Constructionism.
Each one is discussed separately
2 Minimalism
Philosophical questions pose multi-faceted problems. According to Descartes, a
problem space can be decomposed by a divide-and-conquer approach [19]. The
outcome is a set of more approachable sub-problems, interconnected in a sort of
Quinean web of dependencies [18]. When dealing with a philosophical question,
the starting problem often presupposes other open problems and the strength
of the answer depends on the strength of the corresponding assumptions. A
minimalist starting problem relies as little as possible on other open problems,
thereby strengthening the ﬁnal answer to the philosophical question.
Philosophers may improve the tractability of a problem space by choosing
discrete systems with which to study it. Minimalism outlines three criteria to
orientate this choice: controllability, implementability and predictability. Each
deserves a brief comment.
A system is controllable when its structure can be modiﬁed purposefully.
Given this ﬂexibility, the system can be used as a case study to test diﬀerent
solutions for the problem space.
The second minimalist criterion recommends that systems be implementable
physically or by simulation. The system becomes a white box, the opposite of a
black box (see section 4). Metaphorically, the maker of the system is a Platonic
“demiurge”, fully cognisant of the components of the system and of its state
transition rules. The system can therefore be used as a laboratory to test speciﬁc
constraints on the problem space.
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The third criterion follows from the previous two: the chosen system must be
such that its behaviour should be predictable, at least in principle. The demi-
urge can predict the behaviour of the system in that she can infer the correct
consequences from her explanations of the system. The system outcomes become
then the benchmarks of the tested solutions.
Three properties further characterise Minimalism as we advocate it.
First, Minimalism is relational. Problems and systems are never absolutely
minimalist, but always connected with the problem space posed by the philo-
sophical question.
Second, Minimalism provides a way to choose critically the starting problem
for the analysis of a problem space, thus guaranteeing the strength of the next
step in the forward process of answering the philosophical question. According to
a minimalist approach, the tractability of a philosophical problem is a function
of the three criteria outlined above. They allow the use of dynamic systems to
test possible solutions and to derive properties of the problem space.
Finally, Minimalism is a matter of inferential relations between a problem
and its space, but it is not a way to privilege simple or elementary problems.
Minimalist problems may be diﬃcult or complex.
Minimalism is an economic method related to, but not to be confused with,
Ockham’s razor. The two methods are of course compatible. However, whilst
Ockham’s razor avoids inconsistencies and ambiguities by eliminating redun-
dant explicative or ontological elements in a theory, Minimalism provides a set
of criteria for choosing problems and systems relative to a given speciﬁc question.
Moreover, Ockham’s principle of parsimony is absolute and is applied to any the-
oretical element, while Minimalism’s main maxims of strength and tractability
are always relative to a given problem space [13].
A practical example of Minimalism applied to the philosophy of perception
may be helpful. Suppose our investigation concerns the nature of visual percep-
tion. We start from
1. The identification of the question. One begins by asking “what is visual
perception?”. This question poses a wide problem space, hitherto approached
with diﬀerent methods [15].
2. The Cartesian decomposition of the problem is followed by a Quinean con-
struction of the problem space. One proceeds by identifying some well-known
sub-problems of this problem space, such as the nature of internal represen-
tations, the role of mind in perception, and the interpretation of vision as
computation.
3. The identification of the starting problem. The standard representational
interpretation of perception is rich in assumptions about open problems.
Perception is based, for example, on the presumed existence of internal rep-
resentations. The sensorimotor approaches to visual perception are less de-
manding. Perception is chained to action while information is externalised.
James Gibson [10], one of the main advocates of the sensorimotor hypoth-
esis, cannot explain the nature of perceptual errors. This problem does not
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rely on other open problems and therefore can be assumed as a minimalist
starting problem. It can be referred to as “Gibson problem”.
4. The selection of the system to be used to study the starting problem. The
system selected has to be consistent with the requirements of Gibson’s sen-
sorimotor theory and with the criteria for Minimalism. The subsumption
architecture, proposed by Rodney Brooks [2], satisﬁes these requirements.
The architecture of Brooks’ robots is reactive, parallel and decentralised.
Perception and action are directly connected without any explicit internal
representation or centralised inferential engines. Moreover, subsumption ar-
chitectural behaviour is fully speciﬁed by the topological structure of its
layers, composed of single behavioural units. Its demiurge has full control
and predictability power over the system she has built. The Gibson problem
can therefore be studied by means of Brooks’ mobots.
5. The solution of the problem. In the sensorimotor approaches to vision, seeing
is something done by agents in their environments. The deﬁnition of percep-
tual errors must be shifted from a representational interpretation, according
to which errors are incorrect computations made over internal representa-
tions, to an action-based interpretation, according to which errors are unsuc-
cessful actions performed by agents in their environment. If the sensorimotor
features of the mobot enable it to move randomly in its environment then
perception is successful, otherwise its perception is erroneous. The mobot
that collides against a window lacks either the right features or the senso-
rimotor capabilities relative to a given speciﬁc environment and its task of
moving around randomly.
We have just seen how Minimalism orientates the choice of problems and
systems that are tractable. The answer to the initial question “what is visual
perception?” is reached via the solution of localized problems. The minimalist
choice of the problem — and possibly of the system — is reiterated to ensure
the controllability of the whole inferential process of ﬁnding an answer to the
initial philosophical question.
The deﬁnition of Minimalism is based on two main assumptions. The ﬁrst
concerns the existence of a problem space. Minimalism does not give an account
of the decomposition process of the problem space to which it applies. The second
assumption is that a dynamic system, whether conceptual or physically imple-
mented, is useful in ﬁnding the answer to the investigated question. Minimalism
does not explain why and how this approach works. In the next sections, two
other methods are presented to ground both these assumptions: the Method of
Abstraction and Constructionism.
The Method of Abstraction is used to describe the observables that compose
the problem space and how they are related. Minimalism is always relative to a
given Level of Abstraction as the structure of the problem space depends on the
LoA assumed by the investigator.
Constructionism is the precise answer to the need to clarify how to choose the
system and how to use it in order to investigate the set of minimalist problems
that will lead to the required answer.
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3 The Method of Abstraction
The process of making explicit the Level of Abstraction (LoA) at which a system
is considered is called Method of Abstraction [9]. This method pertains to the
analysis of discrete systems, by which we mean those systems whose evolution
is described by explicit transition rules. It applies both to conceptual and to
physical systems. Its pivotal element is the concept of LoA.
The terminology and the study of the method are rooted in a branch of theo-
retical computer science known as Formal Methods. Intuitively, Formal Methods
are a collection of mathematical techniques used to prove that the concrete code
implementation ﬁts the abstract speciﬁcations of a computer system [23]. More
precisely, Formal Methods are a variety of mathematical modelling techniques
used to specify and model the behaviour of a computer system and to verify,
mathematically, that the system design and implementation satisfy functional
requirements.
The metaphor of interface in a computer system is helpful to illustrate what
a LoA is1. As is well known, most users seldom think about the fact that they
employ a variety of interfaces between themselves and the real electromagnetic
and Boolean processes that carry out the required operations. An interface may
be described as an intra-system, which transforms the outputs of system A into
the inputs of system B and vice versa, producing a change in data types. LoAs
are comparable to interfaces because:
1. they are a network of observables;
2. the observables are related by behaviours that moderate the LoA and can
be expressed in terms of transition rules;
3. they are conceptually positioned between data and the agents’ information
spaces;
4. they are the place where (diverse) independent systems meet, act on or
communicate with each other.
LoAs can be connected together to form broader structures of abstraction, from
hierarchy of abstractions to nets of abstraction. One of the possible relations
between LoAs is that of simulation.
Traditionally, a simulation is considered a dynamical representation of a sys-
tem. This means that, if one wishes to produce a simulation, one must extract a
model, by selecting some variables from the investigated system; and then con-
struct an update function, which lets the variables in the simulator change as if
they were the variables observed in the system [20]. In a nutshell, a simulation
is considered the observation of a model that evolves over time. Such deﬁnition,
though correct, is still imprecise because, in order to understand what a simu-
lation is, one also needs to clarify explicitly and precisely what a model is. This
clariﬁcation is currently one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy
of science, and it is far from clear how one may best deal with it. However,
1 For a more technical and in-depth introduction the reader should refer to [9].
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using the Method of Abstraction it becomes possible to characterize the notion
of simulation in a diﬀerent way and hence bypass this diﬃculty.
A simulation relation is now the relation between the observables of a sim-
ulator system and a simulated one [21]. This relation must occur between pairs
of observables in order to guarantee a satisfactory degree of congruence, not
only for the current state of the two systems, but also for their evolution. In
the simulation relation, the epistemic agent is coupling the state evolution of
two systems by observing these two systems at diﬀerent LoAs. This means that
an epistemic agent tries to construct an equivalence relation between the two
systems, seeking to understand at what LoA those systems could be considered
congruent. By way of explanation, let us consider a simple example. Let us ap-
ply the Method of Abstraction and the simulation relation to a new deﬁnition
of functionalism.
Functionalism argues that a physical or abstract entity is identiﬁed by its
causal or operational role. From this viewpoint, a system is not evaluated by
its structures and their interactions, but rather by the functions it shows. If the
“stuﬀ” constituting a system is irrelevant for its identiﬁcation, then the same
functional organization can be realized by diﬀerent systems and substrates, which
are usually called realizations [17]. This is the multi-realizability thesis.
Some philosophers try to rule out multi-realizability from the functionalist
approach [1]. For example, they argue that multi-realizability could lead to a
weakening of a neuroscientiﬁc approach in the explanation of human behaviour.
For why should one be concerned with the actual neural structures if one can
execute an algorithm to instantiate the same behaviours shown by these neural
structures? It is argued that a computational approach is therefore more suitable
for processing those algorithms.
Multirealizability cannot be detached from functionalism since, without it,
functionalism becomes inexplicable. This is clear if we consider the mathematical
concept of function. A function is usually expressed by an operation on one or
more variables, the well-known scheme being f(x) = y. However, this simply
means that the variables in the equation could be replaced or interpreted by an
endless set of numbers or by points over the Cartesian plane or by means of a
Turing machine or by set theory. Without all these instantiations, it would be
impossible to explain the function f(x) = y. We shall therefore conclude that
functionalism entails multi-realizability.
Now, in the classic account of functionalism we deal with relata (the func-
tional organization and the realizations) and relations (the realization relation
between the functional organization and the realizations, and the simulation re-
lation between the various realizations). Our goal is to show that realization and
simulation are equivalent. An epistemic agent can observe any functional orga-
nization, at a speciﬁc LoA, and the realization of that functional organization
at another LoA. Then the realization relation between the two LoAs is charac-
terized by: (a) the codiﬁcation of the inputs of the functional organization LoA
into the inputs of the various realizations LoAs, and (b) the de-codiﬁcation of
the outputs of the latter into the outputs of the former. Basically, simulation
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relation and realization relation are equivalent because they are relations which
describe the same processes. The argument is then that:
1. multi-realizability and functionalism are coupled concepts, and
2. a simulation relation is equivalent to a realization relation.
But then it follows that
3. a common functional organization does not exist at a LoA higher than its re-
alizations. The functional organization is the Net of Abstraction constructed
by the epistemic agents with the simulation relation between the various re-
alizations conceived at diﬀerent LoAs.
This means that it is the relational structure produced by various realizations
and by the simulation relation that connects them. For example, a carpenter who
is making a piece of furniture by following a blueprint is not handling a functional
organization (the blueprint) and a realization (the piece of furniture), but two
realizations at diﬀerent LoAs, which are related in a simulation relation speciﬁed
by his work.
This new interpretation of functionalism leads us to reconsider functional-
istic explanations within the philosophy of AI and the philosophy of mind by
introducing simulation relation as a new device. The functionalist explanation
is conﬁgured as a speciﬁcation of simulations between the LoAs at which the
realizations are organised by the epistemic agent.
4 Constructionism
Providing the guidelines for choosing a problem and supplying a method for
observing and analysing it are two of the fundamental steps in the informa-
tional treatment of philosophical problems. In order to be complete and sound,
the general methodology must also give an account of how the problem must
be investigated once it has been fully delineated. We refer to this method as
Constructionism.
Constructionism is at the core of the epistemological theory proposed by
PI. As for Minimalism and the Method of Abstraction, Constructionism ﬁnds
its roots in both the philosophical tradition and computational theories and
practices.
A black box is a system whose internal structure, rules and composition re-
main undisclosed. A white box is a system about which one knows everything, be-
cause one has constructed it. This perspective, well known in Computer Science
and Artiﬁcial Intelligence, lays in the wake of the so-called maker’s knowledge
tradition, according to which:
1. one can only know what one makes, and therefore
2. one cannot know the genuine nature of reality in itself.
Like Vico and Hobbes [4], philosophers who emphasise (2) argue that, since
any attempt to know the intrinsic nature of the world will inevitably fail, it is
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better to concentrate on those sciences whose subject is created by us, such as
politics and social sciences.
Philosophers who emphasize (1) argue that it is possible to improve our
knowledge of reality through the improvement of our knowledge of the techniques
by which reality is investigated. This tradition ﬁnds its champion in Francis Ba-
con’s philosophy of technology [16] and it is related to Kantism. Following Bacon,
technology becomes the main subject of philosophical enquiry, because it is both
a human product and the means through which the world is investigated. And
when Kant stresses the importance of understanding the conditions of possibil-
ity of our knowledge, he is working within the maker’s knowledge tradition. One
can investigate scientiﬁcally the phenomena one experiences only insofar as one
is epistemically responsible for them.
Constructionism explicitly refers to the maker’s knowledge tradition. Its
method consists of the following ﬁve principles:
1. The Principle of Knowledge: only what is constructible can be known. Any-
thing that can not be constructed could be subject, at most, to working
hypotheses.
2. The Principle of Constructability: working hypotheses are investigated by
(theoretical or practical) simulations based on them.
3. The Principle of Controllability: simulations must be controllable.
4. The Principle of Confirmation: any conﬁrmation or refutation of the hy-
pothesis concerns the simulation, not the simulated.
5. The Principle of Economy: the fewer the conceptual resources used the bet-
ter. In any case, the resources used must be fewer than the results accom-
plished.
Constructionism suggests that, given a theory, one implements and tests it in
a system. Because one constructs the system, one can also control it. As Newell
and Simon remarked “neither machines nor programs are black boxes; they are
artefacts that have been designed, both hardware and software, and we can open
them up and look inside” [14] (for constructionist approaches in Cybernetics and
proto-Cybernetics see [5]).
Consider, for example, behaviour-based robotics. One may observe an ant and
oﬀer a hypothesis about its internal structures in order to explain its behaviours.
Then one may build a system to test that hypothesis. The resulting system is
controllable in that it is modifiable, compositional and predictable. This means
that, as far as the constructed system is concerned: (a) one can change its internal
structures and rules; (b) the system can be implemented by adding or removing
new parts in order to test a variety of hypotheses; and since one knows the rules
of the system, (c) one can know its behaviour. Suppose that the mobot one has
built behaves like the ant one observed. The Principle of Conﬁrmation prevents
her from generalizing the working hypotheses, as if they were the real cause (or
internal structure) of the simulated. It is obviously possible to provide an endless
number of simulations with diﬀerent internal structures whilst still obtaining the
same behaviour. From this, the sub-Principle of Context-dependency is derived:
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isomorphism between the simulated and simulation is only local, not global.
The mobot accounts for the behaviour of the ant only under the constraints
speciﬁed by the simulation. If the constraints change, so does the evaluation of
the hypotheses.
Constructionism is in plain contrast to any mimetic approach in epistemol-
ogy. The latter assumes that reality is approached through some reproductive
or representational mechanism. Ideas, mental images, corresponding pictures,
concepts and so forth are supposed to be mere copies or portraits of some oth-
erwise mysterious reality in itself. From the constructionist point of view, on
the contrary, knowledge is a modelling process, which shapes and edits real-
ity to make it intelligible. It therefore rejects more “mimetic” theories such as
Plato’s, Descartes’ or Locke’s, in favour of a more Kantian approach. The Prin-
ciple of Economy refers to the “careful management of resources”. On the one
hand, in deﬁning knowledge processes, mimetic theories use a large amount of
resources. Assuming that there is a reality and that it works in some particular
way means making a heavy ontological commitment. On the other hand, Con-
structionism does not state anything about reality in itself. This more modest
commitment makes errors less likely. As in the case of Minimalism, the con-
structionist Principle of Economy diﬀers from Ockham’s razor too. While the
latter is a post-production revision tool, for it provides a criterion for choosing
among theories already produced, the former is a pre-design planning norm, for
it requires to be fully aware of the initial assumptions before one undertakes the
investigation process and it binds the construction of any explanatory model to
the conceptual resources available.
The Turing Test (TT) is an enlightening example of how the methodology
outlined in this paper and, more speciﬁcally, the constructionist method, work,
since it respects the minimalist criterion, uses the LoAs and is constructionist.
As we saw earlier, Minimalism concerns the choice of the problem, not of
the explanation. Turing refuses even to try to provide an answer to the question
“can a machine think?”. He considers it a problem “too meaningless to deserve
discussion”, because it involves vague concepts such as ‘machine’ and ‘thinking’
[22]. Turing suggests replacing it with the Imitation Game, which is exactly more
manageable and less demanding from the minimalist point of view. By so doing,
he speciﬁes a LoA and asks a new question, which may be summed up thus:
“can one consider that a machine is thinking at this Level of Abstraction?”. The
rules of the game deﬁne the conditions of observability [9]. If the machine passes
the test at that LoA, one can clearly state that the machine is thinking, at that
LoA. By changing the rules of the game, one changes the LoA and consequently
the answer. Note how TT respects the constructionist principles:
1. By satisfying Minimalism, that is, by refusing to provide a universal deﬁni-
tion of intelligence, Turing also respects the Principle of Knowledge.
2. Turing makes a hypothesis based on the common assumption that conver-
sation skills require intelligence, and then he devises a system to evaluate
whether a machine is intelligent comparatively, that means at that LoA
(Principle of Constructability).
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3. The system is controllable. One knows how it works and how it can be
modiﬁed, so it can be implemented to test other features such as creativity,
learning, and ethical behaviour (Principle of Controllability).
4. If a machine passes the test implies only that the machine can be considered
intelligent at that LoA (Principle of Conﬁrmation).
5. Finally, in tackling the problem of artiﬁcial intelligence, Turing refuses to
avail himself of those approaches that require a large amount of conceptual
resources. This is why, for instance, he refuses to deal with any psychological
assumption about intelligence (Principle of Economy)2.
A strongly constructionist approach grounds not only the design of TT but
also what Turing conjectured as a potentially successful strategy to obtain a ma-
chine that would pass the test. In the ﬁnal section of his 1950 paper, entitled
“Learning Machines”, Turing suggests, as a working hypothesis, that a child-
machine could learn and gain its own knowledge through educational processes.
Then he builds a system, the child-programme, in order to test that hypothesis.
This system is controllable, for example through punishment and reward pro-
cesses. Any hints or results in the process concern only the system and not how a
human child learns. The choice itself of a child-machine, instead of a “grown up”,
respects not only the minimalist criterion but also the Principle of Economy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced three methods and shown how they can be
imported, with some adaptations, from computer science into philosophy, in or-
der to model and analyse conceptual problems. We have outlined their main
features and advantages. The methods clarify implicit assumptions, facilitate
comparisons, enhance rigour and promote the resolution of possible conceptual
confusions. Some applications of the methods discussed in this paper have al-
ready been successfully provided in computer ethics [9], in epistemology [7], and
in the philosophy of information [8]. Of course, the adoption of the methods raises
important further questions. We mention only three of them that seem to us par-
ticularly pressing: (a) What is the logic of problem spaces? (b) What are the
logical relations between LoAs? (c) How can Constructionism avoid solipsism?
We have not attempted to answer these questions, which we hope to address in
future work3.
2 The TT is anti-psychological in the classical Fregean sense.
3 An earlier version of this paper was presented at NA-CAP@CMU 2004, the annual
Computing and Philosophy meeting organised at Carnegie Mellon (4-6 August 2004).
We wish to thank the participants in that meeting, especially Seth Casana, Charles
Ess, Susan Stuart and John Taylor, as well as the participants in the WSPI 2005,
and the two anonymous referees for their feedback. As usual, Jeﬀ Sanders’ input was
fundamental in shaping our ides. This paper is a revised version of [11]. For Italian
legal requirements, Gianluca Paronitti must be considered the author of section 3,
Matteo Turilli of section 2, Luciano Floridi of sections 1 and 5, Gian Maria Greco
of section 4 and the ﬁrst author of the whole paper.
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